Inter-sectoral Competition for Water Allocation in Rural South Africa : Analysing a Case Study Through a Standard Environmental Economics Approach by Stefano Farolfi & Sylvain Perret
1 
 
 
 
 
Inter-sectoral competition for water 
allocation in rural South Africa: 
Analysing a case study through a standard 
environmental economics approach  
 
S. Farolfi & S. Perret  
 
 
 
 
Working paper: 2002-23 
 
 
 
 
Department of Agricultural Economics,  
Extension and Rural Development 
University of Pretoria 
Pretoria, 0002 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
2 
Inter-sectoral competition for water allocation in rural South Africa: 
Analysing a case study through a standard environmental economics approach 
S. Farolfi1 & S. Perret2 
Abstract 
South Africa has adopted an ambitious new water legislation that promotes equity, sustainability, representativity 
and economic performance through water management decentralization, new local and regional management 
institutions, water users’ licensing, and the possible emergence of water rights’ markets. 
This paper addresses the diversity of water users and uses that currently exists in rural areas, and especially 
focuses on the competition for water that may result from such a diversity in a context of water scarcity, and 
from the diversity of objectives formulated by the public authorities. The paper first briefly describes the current 
institutional arrangements regarding access to water. It also presents the situation in rural areas where farming 
communities and the mining sector are interacting on water- and labour-related matters. The paper then presents 
a case study whereby these two sectors have embarked into a negotiation process on water rights transfer, under 
the auspices of several public role players. It proposes an analysis of the case study through a standard 
environmental economics model. The model considers the marginal net private benefit (MNPB) generated by 
mining activities and the associated marginal returns to water (MRW). The transfer of water from farmers to 
mines results in a loss in crop production potential by the farmers and the subsequent loss of income and 
potential for development. Such a loss can be considered the opportunity cost of water for smallholders. If not 
compensated, it represents a proxy of the externality associated with the water transfer. The model first 
highlights the difference in terms of water productivity in the two sectors, and its consequences if a system of 
transferable licenses is adopted. Then, some policy options (taxes, standards, subsidies) are tested and discussed. 
 
1. Introduction 
The National Water Act (1998) of South Africa is internationally recognized as a most promising legal 
framework to adequately address the countries’ challenges in water management (Hamann & O’Riordan, 2000; 
Perret, 2002). However, the Act promotes several objectives (i.e. resource protection, social equity and 
development, economic efficiency) that may seem contradictory in a context of resource scarcity, severe 
backlogs in rural areas, competing users, needs for economic performance and job creation in rural areas, and so 
on. This creates a strong dilemma, which is weighing onto the water allocation processes. Perret (2002) 
described and discussed the institutional context and the possible implications of the new legislation on rural 
settings and especially small-scale irrigation users. This paper proposes a standard environmental economics 
perspective to the issue. 
The paper presents a specific case study in the Olifants River basin, where mines try to extend their water rights 
(quota allocation) at the expense of small-scale developing farmers (Arabie-Olifants irrigation scheme). It first 
describes the specific roles that mining and agricultural activities play in rural areas, and the situation regarding 
the water resource. The paper then briefly presents some key traits of the new water legislation. It proposes a 
standard environmental economics model on externalities’ bargaining to analyse the rising inter-sectoral 
competit ion for water rights between the mining sector and small-scale developing farmers. Finally the paper 
explores policy options for regulating such inter-sectoral competition, or for promoting any given orientation 
(e.g. equity, local rural development, economic performance and job creation, etc.). 
 
1.1. Agriculture and mining as interacting productive primary sectors in rural South Africa 
South Africa is a lower middle-income country characterized by a two-faceted primary economic sector, with 
agriculture and mining. Agriculture accounts for a particularly low share of GDP compared to most other 
countries of its category. Although it has a well-performing commercial sector, agriculture represents about 3.5 
percent of GDP and employs 9 percent of the total active population. Moreover, irrigated agriculture and stock 
watering use about 52 percent of total water. Mining activities account for about 7 percent of GDP and use about 
3% of total water usage. It employs about 6% of the total active population. (Government Communications and 
Information Systems-GCIS, 1998; Forgey et al., 1999). 
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However, these figures do not reflect the actual impact of those two primary activities in rural areas’ livelihood 
systems. Although not declared as formal employment and not generating much cash income, farming activities 
form the backbone of most rural activity systems in the former homeland areas 3, especially for the poorest and 
women-headed households (Barber, 1996; Perret, 2001). Kirsten (1996) highlighted “the lack of diversity in the 
rural non-farm economy and a virtual absence of small-scale industries and other value-adding activities”. A 
major part of rural income is generated through claims, grants, and remittances by migrants. More than 50% of 
rural households use exclusively unpaid family members as farming labour force. 92.6% of them farm only to 
produce enough food for the household to eat (Forgey at al., 1999). More specifically, community gardens and 
smallholding irrigation schemes play key functions on subsistence and food security at community level. Water 
is the most needed input, as expressed by rural households (Forgey et al., 1999). 
Mining and quarrying activities, on the other hand, often offer the only significant formal male employment 
opportunity in deep rural areas, despite current re-structuring plans leading to lay-offs. The sector employs up to 
17% of the employed active population in rural provinces, and provides more than 50% of all formal jobs at 
certain local rural settings (e.g. in the North West province) (Forgey et al., 1999). Mining provides higher paying 
opportunities than farming for rural black labour force (Low, 1986). This off-farm market dominates labour 
allocations and generates adult male migration. Therefore, workers who remain on the farms  are those with the 
lowest opportunity costs as defined by the external labour market, which favours men. Thus, many rural 
households are de facto headed by women or pensioners for whom household and child rearing responsibilities 
exclude them from intensive field labour in agriculture (Perret, 2001). Such is the case in community irrigation 
schemes for instance (Shah & Van Koppen, 1999; Merle et al., 2000). 
The two primary sectors are also increasingly competing for natural resources, and especially water. South 
Africa is a water scarce country, due to its low average annual precipitation (less than 500mm), and the 
unevenness of surface and groundwater distribution that results from climate and geography (21 percent of the 
country receives less than 200mm). Davies & Day (1998) estimate that there will be no spare water in South 
Africa beyond 2020 if the whole population is adequately supplied. For the basin that includes the case study 
area (Olifants River basin, see map 1), there will be no water available for further allocation by 2010. 
 
1.2. A new water legislation and policy 
With the dismantlement of former regulations and the adoption of a new democratic constitution, South Africa 
also adopted a new water policy, represented in the new National Water Act  (RSA-NWA, Act 36 of 1998). The 
new act broke drastically with the previous water laws. Water is now considered a common asset. The right to 
use water is granted to users, most of whom have to be registered and licensed, and should pay for this right. 
Also, the core concept of water management under the new dispensation is decentralization. Finally, protective 
measures are meant to secure water allocation for basic human needs, ecological and development purposes (the 
concept of Reserve).  
Social development, economic growth, ecological integrity and equal access to water remain key objectives of 
the new water resource management regulation. New management entities (Catchment Management Agencies 
and Water Users’ Associations) will be established in order to achieve the aims of the Act. These institutions are 
currently established at regional and local level, respectively, emphasizing a largely decentralized and 
participatory approach to water resource management. The process however shows slow and uneven through out 
the country. Furthermore, past water rights often still apply since the implementation of the new water legislation 
is still under way. 
 
1.3. A legal and economic background for inter-sectoral transfers of water rights  
It has been argued by a number of authors (Armitage, 1999; Louw and Van Schalkwyk, 2000) that the new 
Water Act provides the framework for water markets in South Africa. Although stated vaguely the water 
legislation makes provision for water rights trading as an option for water allocation (the legal transfer of water 
use licenses) (Perret, 2002). Under the past legislation, sectorial water-rights trading occurred and still exists 
between commercial irrigation farmers (Armitage et al., 1999) and has proved efficient in certain instances. It 
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must be emphasized that the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) played an important role in the 
successful cases, assuring transparency, supervising and recording transactions. 
New mines’ settlements and growing water needs form the ground for inter-sectoral transfers. Some settling 
mines are just investigating the possibility of buying water rights from small-scale irrigation schemes (SIS) 
(Development Planning & Research, 2000), while others are already proactive and have embarked onto 
negotiations with communities and/or local, provincial and national authorities (Rouzère, 2001). 
 
Map 1. The Olifants River basin: the former homeland areas, and the case study area (Perret, 2002) 
2. Materials and methods 
The following chapters refer to negotiations that have already taken place in an area of Limpopo (former 
Northern Province) in the water-stressed basin of the Olifants river (see map 1), under close monitoring by 
DWAF and the Limpopo provincial Department of Agriculture and Environment (L-DAE). The idea behind it is 
that most SIS are not currently using their entire water rights, in terms of allocated quantity, while newly settled 
mines or mines expanding their activities are in dire need of water. In the case study, the key stakeholders of the 
negotiation are the mines, the provincial authorities (L-DAE) and DWAF, and the smallholding farmers of the 
Arabie-Olifants irrigation scheme. Primary data and information were collected during a survey (Rouzère, 2001), 
complemented with existing secondary data (DWAF, 2000; BKS, 2001). 
 
2.1. Competition for water between mines and developing farmers  
In the Middle Olifants region, one of the poorest in the country, new mines intend to settle and others wish to 
develop and set up new plants. The sector’s need for water is growing accordingly. The available water of the 
sub-basin, mostly stored upstream the Arabie dam, is already totally allocated (56 million m3 per annum). 
Furthermore, secondary dams are silting up and water stocks are subsequently decreasing. 
In order to increase the resource availability, technical and institutional options have been envisaged. From a 
technical point of view, DWAF proposes to either heighten the Arabie dam by 5 meters, or build another dam 
(further downstream, at Rooipoort). From an institutional point of view, it has been envisaged to re-allocate 
existing water rights, and to delay the application of the Reserve (portion of the resource kept un-available for 
allocation, and dedicated to basic ecological and human needs purposes) until new water-works and resource 
development. 
A smallholding irrigation scheme (Arabie-Olifants I.S.), operated by black communities, lies downstream the 
Arabie dam. It covers 2818 irrigable hectares. 1650 smallholders’ households partake in the scheme, mostly for 
food supply and subsistence purposes. This represents about 13000 people. Plot sizes range from 0.5 to 5 ha. 
According to previous allocation arrangements, the scheme was allocated 18 million m3 per annum, which 
represents about a third of the resource available at sub basin level. However, it is estimated (Rouzère, 2001) that 
farmers currently use less than 30% of this quota (which means that just about 500 ha are probably properly 
irrigated nowadays). Such situation owes to extensive and subsistence-based cropping systems, followed by the 
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majority of non-farming plot occupiers, and to obsolete and deteriorated irrigation infrastructures. It has been 
estimated that full rehabilitation of the scheme’s infrastructures would cost 30 million South African Rand4 
(BKS, 2001). 
In 1999, some mining companies applied for extended water allocations to DWAF for establishing  new plants in 
the area. At the beginning of 2001, in view of the increasing and pressing demand by the mines and the lack of 
further allocable water, DWAF suggested to temporarily re-allocate to mines some water rights currently held by 
farmers (13 of the 18 million m3 per year). Negotiations took place between representatives of the mining sector, 
DWAF and the L-DAE, the latter acting as a representative of smallholders and communities. It was agreed that 
the mining sector would pay a compensation of 7 million Rand, allocated to the partial rehabilitation of the 
irrigation infrastructures. This amount represents less than 0.1% of the total cost of the mining development 
scheme. Such an arrangement is supposed to allow the mines to operate quickly, according to their plans and to 
give DWAF more time to make further plans regarding resource mobilization in the area (upgrading/heightening 
the existing Arabie dam, building a new one).  
As a decision-making support, DWAF built a model on water availability (56 million m3/year) versus demands 
in the area, taking into account the consumption dynamics from 2000 to 2020 for the major sectors: basic human 
and ecological needs (Reserve), domestic water, transfer to Pietersburg (main neighbouring urban centre), 
irrigation and mining. Table 1 sums up the outcomes of a scenario-testing approach with such a model. 
Scenario 1 is the status-quo scenario. Scenarios 2 and 3 can be seen as balanced scenarios, since they 
accommodate the mines’ requirements while protecting other users. Scenario 4 favours mines and still protects 
farmers, but infringes on the reserve. Scenario 5 favours mines and protects the ecological reserve, while leaving 
farmers with a stagnant quota. Scenario 6 clearly favours mining development to the detriment of other users. 
 
Table 1. Scenarios on resource development needs, according to different management options (present secured 
water: 56 million m3/year) 
Source: Rouzère (2001) quoting DWAF. 
 
It must be noticed that: 
· All alternative scenarios envisage water re-allocation from farmers to mines, although most with a 
progressively increasing quota for farmers (2, 3 and 4, allowing for development);  
· Some alternatives investigate quota-freezing or -reduction options for farmers and/or the ecological 
reserve (4, 5 and 6); 
· As a whole, these scenarios aim at two objectives: accommodating new mines’ settlements and giving 
DWAF some time to implement new resource developments; 
· By 2020, the sub basin should be closed in term of water availability anyway (i.e. regardless of new water 
resource development whatsoever), meaning that all users will compete; from the above, it is clear that 
smallholding irrigation farmers will be the targets of water re-allocation, as the unique possible resource. 
Such situation forms the background of the present paper. A standard environmental economics model is 
developed and represents the competing demands for water from the mining sector and the smallholding 
irrigation sector. 
 
2.2. The model: mines’ returns to water vs. farmers’ opportunity cost of water 
Mines are considered the potential beneficiaries of water rights transferred from the small-scale irrigation sector. 
The ideal and correct way of presenting the comparative analysis and tradeoffs is to use marginal values. That 
means comparing mines’ Marginal Returns to Water (MRW) with the Marginal Opportunity Cost (MOC)  that 
results from the non-use of water by the smallholders (considered here a negative externality). However, lack of 
data precluded derivations of marginal values and this study could only estimate average returns and costs. These 
are used as proxies to marginal values to conduct the analysis .  
Five new mining sites (see figure 1) will be developed in the area. Their aggregated water demand is deemed to 
reach approximately 24 million m3/year by 2020. The annual benefit of Anglo Platinum (the biggest mining 
                                                             
4 Exchange rate: 1 US$ makes about 10 South African Rand (mid 2002) 
Scenarios: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Allowing partial mining development No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Allowing for complete mining development No No Yes No No Yes
Water re-allocation from irrigation to mines No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Limited ecological reserve until 2009 No No No Yes No Yes
Limited irrigation development until 2009 No No No No Yes Yes
Need for heightening the existing dam (Arabie) 2010 2005 2004 - - -
Need for building a new dam (Rooipoort) - 2009 2007 2009 2008 2009
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group in South Africa) is R 1.75 billion per mining site5. One of the five new sites will be theirs. It is assumed 
that all sites will have the same water productivity, meaning an even MRW per unit of water used (supposed to 
be 25% of the marginal benefit). Finally, it is assumed that the MRW  curve is linear6 (as well as the Marginal 
Net Private Benefit curve in: Pearce & Turner, 1990; Baumol & Oates, 1988) and that the different mining 
companies co-ordinate their water demand (aggregation of MRW). The sector’s MRW by 2020 is represented in 
figure 1, as well as the MRW curves of each mining site7. At this stage we consider that mines have no 
possibility to save on water through technical innovation. Therefore, the only way to save on water is to reduce 
production. Technical innovation will be c onsidered later on.  
 
Figure 1. Marginal Returns to Water vs. water consumption within the mining sector (in a sector co-ordination 
scenario) 
The mining sector MRW curve in the case study area has the following function8, according to the above-
mentioned assumptions: 
y = -0.00228x + 54.48 
 
where:  
y= mines’ sector Marginal Returns to Water (in R/m3water) 
x= water used (in 000 m3) 
 
Integrating that function for 0<x<23.944 provides the Returns to Water (RW) of the mining sector in the area: 
 
                                                             
5 Calculated as follows: 7 billion R is the benefit realised by the group Anglo-Platinum in 2000 (Rouzère, 2001). Four Anglo-Platinum 
mining sites are at present operating in South Africa and they have approximately the same size. The new site foreseen in the studied area 
will also have the same size. Therefore, annual benefit as R 1.75 billion has been estimated.  The poor availability of figures in this economic 
sector  requires on the one hand making many assumptions and on the other hand investigating on the nature of these data. Particularly, a 
crucial point for future analysis is to clarify the nature of  the “benefits” indicated by the available sources. In fact the results of our model 
may change radically if these “benefits” are “pure profits” (margins after having subtracted from the gross income returns to capital, 
resources, labour, and input costs), or  “gross margins”, and in this case it would be important to understand what returns are still included 
within the so-called “benefits”. In the model it is assumed that the residual returns to water is 25% of the “benefits” for both the mining 
sector and smallholders.  
6 The same assumption is made for  MOC as well.  
7 Another way to estimate the water value for different users is to build production functions where water is one of the production inputs. 
These functions are econometrically derived from available data. 
8 For the estimation of the MRW function, assuming the values of MRW at x=0 =[(NPB/water consumption*2)*0.25] and at x=23.944 
million m3 (MRW=0), a line can be traced, which links up these points and corresponds to the MRW function.  
The same method has been used for calculating MOC of water for smallholders. 
000 m
3
R
/m
3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
0 4000 8000 12000 16000 20000 24000
Trojan Platinum
Anglo Platinum
ASA Metals
Samancor
Samrec
MRW mines (org.)
7 
ò ¶+=
23944
0
x 54.48)  (-0.00228xRW  
At present, 18 million m3 of water are allocated to smallholding irrigation farmers downstream the Arabie dam. 
About five million are actually used for irrigation. Considering the productivity of irrigation water for different 
crops and the existing farming systems, it has been chosen to put forward two types of scenarios in terms of 
scheme’s orientation. On the one hand, a subsistence-based scenario actually reflects the current situation 
whereby farmers are valuing irrigation water mostly through maize production for self-consumption (benefits = 
0.57 R per m3). On the other hand, a commercial orientation scenario suggests that increased use of inputs by 
farmers, training and secured access to markets and to water (especially in winter) would increase land 
productivity and net income, generate crop diversification, and water productivity (benefits = 1.98 R per m3). 
Although simplistic, these scenarios reflect the options and challenges facing the farmers in the Arabie -Olifants 
scheme. As for the mining sector, returns to water have been considered as 25% of the calculated benefits for the 
two types of smallholders (table 2).  
 
Table 2. Returns to water at farming system levels in the case study area (drawn from Perret & Touchain, 2002; 
Merle et al, 2000; Small & Stimie, 2000) 
 
Farming systems 
Returns to water per m3 of irrigation water used 
Subsistence-based farming systems, with casual 
marketing (low yielding summer maize, no winter 
crops) 
0.14 R per m3 
Commercially oriented farming system (average 
yielding summer maize, mostly sold, vegetable crops 
grown in winter) 
0.50 R per m3 
 
This allows an evaluation of the opportunity costs resulting from a transfer of water from farmers to the mining 
sector. Such costs are considered the loss of private benefits resulting from the “non-use” of water by irrigation 
farmers9. Such non-use of water refers to dry land cropping, which, in the semi-arid case study area, is 
impossible in winter (vegetable crops), and leads to high risks of maize cropping failure in summer. Such 
situation allows for the assumption that dryland cropping does not generate any net income (farmers faced with 
frequent water shortage usually eventually relinquish crop farming). 
Because negotiations between smallholders and mines call for a re-habilitation of the scheme by 2015, the 
opportunity cost has to be applied to the whole amount of water allocated to farmers, although they use only 
30% of it. According to table 2, a commercially oriented scheme generates the best returns to water (0.5 R per 
m3), which is one scenario proposed here. The second scenario, more realistic with respect to the current 
situation, suggests a subsistence-based scheme, which values returns to water at 0.14 R per m3. Smallholders’ 
water Marginal Opportunity Cost (MOC) is calculated making the same assumptions as for the mining sector’s 
MRW.  
 
Assuming that the MOC curve is linear, the two scenarios regarding the scheme’s orientation have the following 
functions: 
y = 0.0000555 x  for the commercial scenario  
y = 0.0000155x   for the subsistence scenario 
where:  
y= smallholders’ MOC for water (in R per m3) 
x= water used (in 000 m3) 
                                                             
9 With regard to the negative as well as the positive externalities incurred with the transfer of water from agriculture to the mining sector, the 
calculated opportunity cost of water for smallholders under-estimates them, because it does not consider important social effects (e.g. 
unemployment) and environmental effects (e.g. loss of fertility in abandoned land). On the other hand, it is even higher than the farmers’ 
perception of the external cost. The latter is for them identifiable with the gross productivity (not considering returns to labour, capital and 
resources)  of water in the area, which is often not higher than the 1.6 cents/m3 corresponding to non irrigated crops.  
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These MOC curves are shown in figure 2 (using logarithmic scale in y axis, for clarity purpose), where they are 
confronted with mines’ MRW. The hypothesis is that up to x’ (6 million m3/year), mines’ water demand is 
satisfied at the expense of the Reserve10 or, in any case, not intaking the 18 million m3/year allocated to 
smallholders. Therefore, up to x’, there is no MOC of water for smallholders. 
The MOC curves in this figure have the following functions:  
y = 0.0000555 x-0.333  for the commercial scenario 
y = 0.0000155x-0.093   for the subsistence scenario11 
 
Figure 2. Mining sector’s MRW and farmers’ water MOC vs. water consumption by the mining sector (logarithmic 
scale in y axis, for clarity purpose) 
 
 
3. Discussion: setting up policy tools 
The model lies on empirical data collected on a case study. In spite of a number of assumptions and uncertainties 
about the figures that weaken its genericity, such model proves interesting for investigation and demonstration 
purposes. The model clearly reveals the difference in economic power between the two sectors. This means that 
a direct negotiation (in the sense of Coase, 1960) on water rights transfer between mines and smallholders is 
likely to end up with an almost complete transfer of water rights to the mining sector. This would certainly have 
positive consequences in terms of strict economic efficiency, water productivity, and even formal employment in 
the area. On the other hand, such a transfer would challenge certain objectives of the government, which go 
beyond mere economic perspectives and include equity, sustainable rural development, environment protection, 
and the like. Certain economic or regulatory policy tools may be implemented, as alternatives towards a more 
balanced allocation of water. 
In order to simplify the presentation, the volumes of water introduced above will be approximated as follows: 
mining sector needs =24 million m3/year; present allocation to smallholders = 18 million m3/year; water at 
present really used by smallholders = 5 million m3/year; water belonging to the Reserve = 6 million m3/year. 
                                                             
10  For a definition of the Reserve, see 2.1. 
11 If water MOC for smallholders is related to the present use of water (30% of the total allocation = 5.4 million m3/year), the MOC function 
is: 
y = 0.0000555 x-1.032  for the commercial scenario 
y = 0.0000155x-0.2883   for the subsistence scenario. 
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3.1. Definition of a norm (or standard) 
A first option may be the definition of a norm or standard, in the form of a reserved quota for irrigation. Such an 
option is one of the key features of the scenarios that DWAF envisages in the case study (see table 1, with 
application to smallholding irrigation and/or the ecological reserve). Figure 3 shows how this option preserves 5 
million m3 for small-scale irrigation use, and alters the mining sector’s MRW. A penalty (P’) should be 
combined with the definition of the norm. Such a penalty corresponds to the MRW of the mining sector (as 
shown in figure 1), but at the level of the norm (19 million m3, the penalty being set at about R11 per m3). No 
double dividend is generated with such a tool.  
A new function defines the MRWs’ of mines respecting the standard (19 million m3): 
y = -0.0029x + 54.48 
If the government wants to preserve the Reserve along with the quota effectively used by the smallholders, the 
standard will be set at  S”, the related penalty being P” (i.e. 25 R/m3), and the new function defining MRWs” 
being:  
y = -0.0042x + 54.48 
 
Figure 3. Using standards for preserving smallholders’ quotas and the Reserve 
 
 
3.2. Water use tax 
A second option may be to levy a tax from the mines for using water acquired from a transfer. Figure 4 shows 
that a tax of 11 R per m3 used (t’) would set the mines’ MRW to zero at a water consumption of 19 million m3. 
Hence the likely preservation of a 5 million m3 quota for irrigation farmers. This would also generate a water 
management revenue (double dividend), which might be used for several purposes, e.g. rehabilitation of 
irrigation schemes, unemployment and welfare grants, inciting measures and aids to mines for water saving and 
recycling, and so on. 
Similarly, a tax of 25 R per m3 (t”) could set mines’ MRW to zero at a water consumption of 13 million m3, 
which would preserve the Reserve quota and therefore match the environmental objective in addition to the 
equity one.  
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Figure 4. Taxation of mining water use: downsizing the mining sector’s MRW and securing  quotas for irrigation 
and the Reserve 
 
 
3.3. Bounded water rights market 
The National Water Act explicitly mentions the possibility to exchange and trade water rights, allowing for 
establishment intra- and inter-sectoral water-rights markets. The base model (figure 2) reflects a free market 
situation whereby there is no limitation to water right transfers amongst sectors or users, and the Reserve is first 
allocated to mines. In such a case, establishing a negotiation between mines and smallholders for a 18 million 
m3/year initially allocated to smallholders would draw the system to a quasi-complete transfer of these quotas to 
the mining sector. Even in the most optimistic scenario of commercial farming, less than one million m3 would 
stay in the agricultural sector.  
If the Reserve is not previously allocated to the mining sector, then mines and smallholders will compete not 
from x0=6000, but from x0=0; in other word, the MOC will be positive from x0=0. This case is illustrated in 
figure 5, which shows that: i) leaving complete freedom to market forces would quickly transfer all the water 
allocated to smallholders to mines; and ii) setting a limit (quota) preserving agriculture (5 million m3/year) and 
the Reserve (6 million m3/year), in other words bounding the water rights ma rket within the 13 million m3/year 
currently unused by the agricultural sector is an unrealistic and cost-uneffective solution. The huge gap between 
the price of one cubic meter of water corresponding to a mines’ consumption of 13 million m3/year, respectively 
for the mining sector (Pm), and for smallholding irrigation (in the two scenarios envisaged: PSc for commercial 
and PSs for subsistence) does not allow for a realistic application of an inter-sectoral bounded water-rights 
market. If one wants to reach the same result (i.e. the application of the “user pays” principle), a tax applied to 
the wealthier sector appears to be a more suitable instrument. 
 
3.4. Incentives for water-saving technologies and innovation 
Finally, the mining sector has already announced its willingness to introduce water-saving technologies, enabling 
it to reduce water consumption up to 4 times by 2020. Every sector and water management at large in the area 
would benefit from such a strategy, since it would sustain the mines’ level of productivity while preserving the 
resource and other users. Overall, externalities and negative impacts on other sectors’ allocation would be 
reduced (Ayres, 2000). Unfortunately, in the case of the Arabie area, such improvement would just delay the 
competition for water and the need for extended resource. DWAF reckons that the area would face water 
resource closure by 2020 anyway. An inter-sectoral competition, and possible conflicts, are therefore inevitable. 
Figure 6 illustrates the changes in mines’ MRW resulting from a 100% water saving through innovation and 
technology change. 
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Figure 5. Water-use tradable permits with a limit to 13 million m3/year  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 . MRW mines at present, and with a 100% water saving through innovation and technology change 
4. Conclusions  
The productivity of water in the mining sector is far higher than the one of smallholders’ irrigation. Such a gap 
allows for the mining sector to offer prices for water rights (licences) ten to twenty times higher than the 
smallholders (in case of a water rights market being established). If a free water-right market were really 
implemented, such unbalanced willingness to pay would result in the total transfer of water rights allocated to 
the smallholding irrigation sector towards the mining sector (18 million m3 per year). The latter will need more 
water anyway, in order to satisfy its needs. Further water (about 6 million m3) would then be taken from the 
ecological reserve, or through resource development (a new dam).  
As reported by Romano (2001), such a process occurred in Chile during the last 20 years, after the 
implementation of a liberal water legislation that established a free water-rights market (public authorities just 
recorded the transactions but did not intervene in any manner whatsoever in their contents). Smallholders 
progressively sold their rights to other users, resulting into decreasing agricultural production, then further rural 
poverty. 
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If a certain amount of water is to be reserved for the smallholding agricultural sector (e.g. the 5 million m3 per 
year currently used), for equity and rural development concerns for instance, an intervention by the public 
authorities is necessary. The model allows for testing some water-management policy tools. Some may show 
effective and useful with regard to the above-mentioned concerns. 
The simple definition of a norm, in the form of a quota of water compulsorily reserved for agricultural use 
(command and control approach), raises the problem as to how to control the system, enforce it, and deal with 
possible transgressions. The model allows for the calculation of the effective penalty to be imposed to 
transgressors. This approach, besides the issues and costs related to control and enforcement, does not create any 
double dividend. It leaves mines with a higher benefit for the same amount of water allocated, which is not the 
case when considering a tax (see below). Finally, such a system refers to the “compulsory licensing” one that 
DWAF plans to implement in resource constrained basins (DWAF allocates non-transferrable quotas to the 
different users, regardless of their specific demand).  
The adoption of a tax per m3 of water used by the mining sector is another option (as an economic instrument). 
The model shows that, in order to sustain the current quota used by smallholding agriculture, a 11R/m3 tax 
should be levied from the mining sector. This tax would rise up to 25R/m3 if the Reserve quota has to be 
preserved. Although theoretically possible and relevant, such a levy may prove difficult to justify and to 
implement. This type of measure would drastically reduce the private benefit of mines and would create a double 
dividend (in the form of an income to the water management entity), which might be used within the sector (e.g. 
through incentives for those mines willing to invest in water-saving technologies), or outside the sector (e.g. for 
general water management purposes).  
The hypothesis of allocating 18 million m3 per year to the smallholding irrigation sector, and the subsequent 
establishment of a water-rights market limited to 13 million m3 per year, does not seem realistic. The gap in the 
willingness to pay water between the two sectors is too large and would lead to a quick and total transfer of 
licences to the mining sector. Therefore, in order to avoid transaction costs, the direct allocation of 13 million m3 
per year to mines, imposing a price that corresponds to the their willingness to pay at x=13 million, would be 
preferable.  
Finally, a policy that pushes mines to invest in water-saving technological innovation would be relevant in the 
studied case. Mines express their willingness to adopt technological solutions for water-saving, and the model 
has shown the benefits for the whole system in terms of economic efficiency, and environmental and social 
sustainability resulting from a reduction of water consumption by the mining sector.  
This objective could be pursued through a balanced use of economic instruments (water charges and subsidies), 
aiming at modifying the mines behaviour with respect to water use within their production processes. A system 
based on the “user pays” principle, complemented by its corollary “those who invest in water saving techniques 
will be subsidised” (Farolfi & Montaigne, 2001) could be of interest in the analysed context. 
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